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a b s t r a c t
Household energy conservation has emerged as a major challenge and opportunity for researchers,
practitioners and policymakers. Consumers also seem to be gaining greater awareness of the value and
need for sustainable energy practices, particularly amid growing public concerns over greenhouse gas
emissions and climate change. Yet even with adequate knowledge of how to save energy and a professed
desire to do so, many consumers still fail to take noticeable steps towards energy efﬁciency and
conservation. There is often a sizeable discrepancy between peoples’ self-reported knowledge, values,
attitudes and intentions, and their observable behaviour—examples include the well-known ‘knowl-
edge-action gap’ and ‘value-action gap’. But neither is household energy consumption driven primarily
by ﬁnancial incentives and the rational pursuit of material interests. In fact, people sometimes respond
in unexpected and undesirable ways to rewards and sanctions intended to shift consumers’ cost–beneﬁt
calculus in favour of sustainable behaviours. Why is this so? Why is household energy consumption and
conservation difﬁcult to predict from either core values or material interests? By drawing on critical
insights from behavioural economics and psychology, we illuminate the key cognitive biases and
motivational factors that may explain why energy-related behaviour so often fails to align with either the
personal values or material interests of consumers. Understanding these psychological phenomena can
make household and community responses to public policy interventions less surprising, and in parallel,
can help us design more cost-effective and mass-scalable behavioural solutions to encourage renewable
and sustainable energy use among consumers.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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1. Introduction
Consumer behaviour is complex and rarely follows traditional
economic theories of decision-making. When choosing what
products to buy or what services to use, people often think they
are making smart decisions and behaving in ways that are highly
rational and congruent with their values and intentions. However,
daily life illustrates that this is often not the case. People routinely
deviate from the ‘rational choice’ model of human behaviour, in
which one objectively weighs up the costs and beneﬁts of all
alternatives before choosing the optimal course of action. But neither
is human decision-making reliably predicted by what people know is
the ‘best’ or feel is the ‘right’ thing to do. For example, so-called ‘green’
knowledge and values – such as knowing about or feeling positive
towards the use of renewable resources, sustainable products, low-
emission technology, public transportation, and so forth – do not
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reliably translate into pro-environmental choices when buying goods
or using services that impact the environment. Many people still rely
heavily on non-renewable resources, under-use public transport, fail to
recycle, and engage in other everyday actions that harm or neglect the
environment—actions they may themselves acknowledge as ‘wasteful’
and economists deem sub-optimal. Even consumers who face strong
material incentives, and/or possess knowledge and motivation
patently sufﬁcient to act in more sustainable ways, may struggle to
shift their behaviour in the desired direction, particularly over the
longer term.
First, it is clear that what people say and what they do are
sometimes very different things. In many domains of human
behaviour, we see a knowledge-action gap [1–3], a value-action gap
[4–7], an attitude-action gap [5], and/or an intention-action gap [8,9].
For example, people may know about, intrinsically value, hold
positive attitudes towards, and/or genuinely intend to act in some
socially desirable way. Yet often these things do not translate into
actual behaviour. One domain of consumer behaviour where this
disjuncture is evident is residential energy use [6,7,10,11]. Many
people report that they are concerned about climate change and
understand the importance of saving energy, yet this concern does
not reliably translate into taking ongoing, practical steps to reduce
household energy consumption. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that
traditional education programmes and mass media campaigns –
which strive to promote pro-environmental knowledge and attitudes
by simply disseminating information – often fail to produce the
durable behaviour change that is intended [12–14].
At the same time, it is also clear that people’s behaviour does not
generally fall short of their environmental concerns and commit-
ments simply because they are pursuing material interests and
extrinsic rewards. Even where energy-saving measures are demon-
strably cost-effective (e.g., insulation, low-carbon technology) –
making uptake of the technology or behaviour economically rational
for the consumer – many people remain reluctant to introduce these
things into their lives and homes. In fact, offering extrinsic rewards
and ﬁnancial incentives to encourage pro-social behaviour (e.g.,
volunteering, reciprocity, civic duty, charitable donations, or other
‘public good’ contributions), presumably by prompting more favour-
able cost–beneﬁt appraisals, can sometimes backﬁre and decrease the
desired behaviour by ‘crowding out’ intrinsic motivation to act
altruistically [15–18].
Though not reliably predicted by either environmental con-
cerns or material interests, individual choices around pro-
environmental behaviour and resource consumption are, in fact,
predictable—they are ‘predictably irrational’ [19]. As with much of
human behaviour, energy-related practices are often inﬂuenced by
certain cognitive biases and ‘irrational’ tendencies that, while
producing decisions and actions that may be surprising from the
standpoint of traditional economic models, are actually rather
predictable (and even adaptive/functional) from the perspective of
psychology and behavioural economics [20–23].
2. Applying psychology and behavioural economics to explain,
predict and change consumer behaviour
Traditional economic theory postulates that human decision-
making and behaviour are based on purely rational choice [24–26].
More recent neoclassical economic approaches3 also rest on several
fundamental assumptions aligned with rational choice theory (for
overviews, see [28–30])—namely, that people have rational prefer-
ences among outcomes, always strive to maximise utility, and act
independently based on full and relevant information [31,32]. Based
on these assumptions, traditional economic models predict that
people will make decisions that yield the optimal result given budget
constraints, and that behavioural choices can be improved by
providing people with more information (i.e., by increasing knowl-
edge/awareness) and/or more options (i.e., by increasing choices).
In stark contrast to such assumptions, a growing body of scientiﬁc
research demonstrates that people are rarely the rational decision-
makers envisaged by traditional economic models of human beha-
viour. Empirical evidence from psychology and behavioural econom-
ics shows that consumer choices and actions often deviate
systematically from neoclassical economic assumptions of rationality,
and there are certain fundamental and persistent biases in human
decision-making that regularly produce behaviour that these
assumptions cannot account for (see [22,23,33–35]). Many of these
biases stem from simple ‘rules-of-thumb’, ‘heuristics’ and mental
‘shortcuts’ that alleviate the need for more effortful information
processing, thereby hastening the speed of problem-solving and
decision-making, particularly in situations characterised by high
levels of complexity, choice, risk and uncertainty [36–39]4.
A comprehensive review of all cognitive biases and behavioural
anomalies is beyond the scope of this paper, but several seem
particularly relevant to understanding energy consumption, especially
in terms of predicting and changing the behaviour of individuals and
households. As outlined below, among the most powerful and
pervasive biases to inﬂuence consumers’ patterns of energy usage
include the status quo bias, loss and risk aversion, sunk-cost effects,
temporal and spatial discounting, and the availability bias. In parallel,
psychological phenomena such as normative social inﬂuence, intrinsic
and extrinsic rewards, and trust may also play a key role. A large body
of research shows that even where cost–beneﬁt calculations would
suggest more materially advantageous choices, people persist in
displaying seemingly irrational, yet predictable tendencies to:
1. retain the status quo, stick to default settings or defer decision-
making entirely (inertia), especially as the amount or complex-
ity of information increases [43,44]. For example, people tend
to resist change and ‘go with the ﬂow’ of pre-set options, even
where alternatives may yield better (e.g., more ﬁnancially
rewarding or materially advantageous) personal or collective
outcomes. Providing a default not only saves people time (by
relieving them of having to make an active choice), but it
might also be viewed as the best option (since it is apparently
being ‘recommended’ by the provider; [45]). Evidence of this
status quo bias has been observed across a range of experi-
mental and applied contexts, including residential energy
consumption (for examples, see [45–47])5.
3 Neoclassical approaches conceptualise the economy as consisting of proﬁt-
maximising organisations and utility-maximising consumers who interact in
perfectly competitive markets. This approach has been deﬁned as ‘economics
based on maximization-with-equilibrium’ [27] and draws on principles of utility
maximisation, equilibrium and efﬁciency. Neoclassical theorists view economic
behaviour as highly rational and self-interested—e.g., ﬁrms strive to maximise
(footnote continued)
proﬁt by producing and supplying goods/services, while householders strive to
maximise utility by consuming these goods/services.
4 In daily life, people encounter vast amounts of information and a seemingly
endless array of choices. Yet human beings are ‘boundedly rational’ [24,25]; they
have limited cognitive resources, which naturally constrains optimal decision-
making. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that people prefer simplicity and rely on
mental shortcuts to bypass more intensive information processing and conscious
deliberation—it makes things easier, simpler and faster. At the same time, relying
on decision-making heuristics may also lead to systematic biases and other
cognitive errors, particularly when people are faced with too much information
(cognitive overload) or too many options (choice overload) [37,40–42].
5 The status quo bias has been found to inﬂuence choices as diverse as car
colour, health plans, retirement programs, budgeting and other ﬁnancial decisions
[44,48], as well as consumer valuations of unpriced products/services [47]. For
example, Hartman et al. [47] found status quo effects in consumers’ estimates of
the reliability of residential electrical services, with more recent studies ﬁnding
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2. satisﬁce by exerting only the effort needed to achieve
a satisfactory rather than an optimal result; that is, settling for
‘good enough’ rather than ‘best’ [24,25,49]. When overloaded
with information or complexity, people are often incapable of
‘optimising’ (i.e., systematically processing all available infor-
mation to maximise utility) and tend to choose not necessarily
the best option or solution to a problem, but rather the ﬁrst
available option or solution that sufﬁces, or satisﬁes the mini-
mum requirements [34]. This tendency, known as satisﬁcing
[24,25], facilitates more rapid, less effortful information proces-
sing, problem-solving and decision-making, while also afford-
ing potential wellbeing beneﬁts (see [50]). For example, people
typically process only enough information to reach a satisfac-
tory decision rather than processing all available information to
reach an optimal decision, as the latter demands much more
time, effort and resources than would ordinarily seem justiﬁed
by the prospective increase in utility or satisfaction6. Yet this
tendency to settle for ‘good enough’ may come at a price, with
people often making worse decisions and poorer choices (or
avoiding action altogether) when faced with more information
and/or options [51,52].
3. be loss averse by weighing losses more heavily than equal-
sized gains, particularly as the stakes rise [33,43]. For example,
people typically focus on the risks, costs or losses associated
with adopting a new behaviour, such as ﬁnancial costs (what
will it cost me?), physical risks (is it safe/healthy?), social costs
(what do others think?), ecological risks (is it environmentally
friendly?), time costs (will it take longer?), functional risks
(does it ﬁt my routine?), and even psychological costs (how
will I feel?), and tend to discount equivalent gains and
beneﬁts. When faced with making a decision, people perceive
the disutility of losing something as far greater than the utility
of gaining something (i.e., they feel the pain of losses far more
than the pleasure of gains). This tendency is reﬂected by
contingent valuation studies that show that willingness to
accept tends to be higher than willingness to pay [20,53].
4. be more risk averse when faced with certain (high probability)
gains or uncertain (low probability) losses, but more risk-
seeking when faced with certain losses or uncertain gains
[54,55]. Generally speaking, people prefer to avoid risk
given the prospect of positive outcomes (i.e., gains), but the
reverse is true given the prospect of negative outcomes
(i.e., losses). That is, people are more willing to gamble or take
a chance (i.e., engage in risky behaviour) to avoid a certain loss
than to secure an equal-sized gain [55–57]. Yet risk-seeking
and risk aversion also depend on what is at stake, with risky
decisions often more apparent for smaller-stakes gambles.
This tendency to be less risk averse and more risk-seeking
for small-stakes gambles than for large-stakes is known as the
‘peanuts effect’, i.e., people are more willing to take a chance
when playing for ‘peanuts’ [58,59]. That is, risk-seeking
decreases when the (loss) stakes are high, such that people
are more risk-seeking for small losses than for large losses.
And risk aversion decreases when the (gain) stakes are low,
such that people are less risk averse for small gains than for
large gains.
5. persist with an endeavour once valued resources such as time,
effort and money (now ‘sunk costs’) have already been
invested, a phenomenon known as the sunk cost effect
[56,60,61]. People tend to become irrationally ﬁxated on
‘recovering’ losses already suffered, discounting future costs
and beneﬁts. Once time, effort or money has been invested in a
particular endeavour, they may persist with that course of
action and ‘throw good money after bad’ even as it becomes
riskier or increasingly unlikely to yield the desired result.
Some researchers have attributed this tendency to an over-
generalisation of the ‘Don’t waste’ rule that many people have
learned during childhood, i.e., the notion that avoiding waste
is generally advisable, so abandoning a prior investment may
seem to ‘waste’ the resources already expended [62]. Sunk-
cost effects have been observed for both business and personal
decision-making, and across a range of applied and experi-
mental contexts [56,60,61,63]. For example, research suggests
that paying for the right to use a good or service will increase
the rate at which the good/service will be used, all else being
equal (see [56]). In the residential energy domain, for instance,
a consumer who outlays time, effort and money to purchase
an electrical appliance (e.g., air conditioner, extra refrigerator)
may tend to use it more, even when it is not necessarily
required.
6. perceive things as less valuable or signiﬁcant if further away in
time (temporal discounting) or space (spatial discounting), even
if such things afford long-term beneﬁts [64–67]. For example,
people often ‘discount the future’ by preferring smaller
immediate rewards (e.g., $5 now) over larger future rewards
(e.g., $10 next year), and they may avoid actions that are costly
in the short-term (e.g., outlaying time and money to purchase
new energy-efﬁcient appliances or making an effort to switch
energy retailers), despite offering longer-term beneﬁts (e.g.,
reduced electricity bills). This tendency to be short-sighted
and make time-inconsistent judgements often leads to pro-
crastination, inertia and decreased cooperation in group set-
tings [68,69].
7. make social comparisons, follow the behaviour of others, and
conform to social norms, that is, the explicit and implicit ‘rules’,
guidelines or behavioural expectations within a group or
society that shape what is deemed normal or desirable
[70–72]. People are generally inﬂuenced by the attitudes and
behaviours of others, and tend to follow norms reﬂecting what
is socially approved (i.e., injunctive norms, which motivate by
providing social rewards/punishment) and/or common (i.e.,
descriptive norms, which motivate by providing suggestions
about effective and adaptive behaviour). For example, merely
communicating a descriptive norm, such as describing how
most people behave in a given situation, can motivate con-
formity [73]. This normative social inﬂuence is powerful and
pervasive, as reﬂected in the tendency to conform by ‘follow-
ing the herd’ (herd behaviour) and ‘jumping on the bandwa-
gon’ (the bandwagon effect) [74–76]. People also tend to make
social comparisons and evaluate their own performance,
possessions and wellbeing not in absolute terms, but relative
to others [77,78].
8. be motivated by rewards and incentives, both intrinsic (e.g.,
achieving social equity/fairness, the ‘warm glow’ of acting
altruistically)7 and extrinsic (e.g., money) [80,81]. In general,
(footnote continued)
that consumers are reluctant to switch brands or choose new electricity suppliers,
even if doing so is beneﬁcial or they are educated about product/service character-
istics [45,46].
6 For example, householders may set themselves minimally acceptable, but not
optimal, targets for saving energy (e.g., buying a single energy-efﬁcient appliance;
or registering for the bare minimum amount of ‘green’ electricity), and consumers
may purchase products and services that satisfy basic needs, without necessarily
being the most optimal choice (e.g., buying the ﬁrst energy-saving device that
seems suitable, rather than systematically evaluating the available options to select
the most cost-effective and energy-efﬁcient).
7 The ‘warm-glow’ effect [79] proposes that rather than acting solely on the
basis of self-gain or self-interest, people are intrinsically motivated to behave in
pro-social ways because it makes them feel ‘better’ about themselves (e.g.,
increased self-esteem from viewing oneself as selﬂess and socially responsible)
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larger incentives or disincentives lead to greater behavioural
responses [14]. However, the effects of ﬁnancial incentives are
often surprisingly short-lived and/or inconsistent, with beha-
viour reverting back to baseline levels upon removal of the
reward [82,83]. People may even respond negatively to
extrinsic rewards (e.g., showing loss of motivation, overjusti-
ﬁcation, moral licensing effects; see [84–87]), particularly if
intrinsic motivation for the target behaviour is already high8.
For example, if a person is intrinsically motivated to be
altruistic, giving a piece-rate monetary reward to incentivise
the desired behaviour may have a counteractive effect by
‘crowding out’ the intrinsic motivation [18,87–89]9.
9. reduce effort, withhold resources, or contribute less to the
common good if they can gain the same beneﬁts without
paying for them, or believe others are enjoying beneﬁts with-
out contributing (free-riding effect) [92,93]. People also tend to
exert less effort to achieve a goal when working in a group
than when working independently (i.e., social loaﬁng, see
[94]), with motivation also declining the more dispensable
one’s own efforts appear to group success [95].
10. use trust as a simple decision-making heuristic when assessing
risk and making cost-beneﬁt appraisals [96–101], with an
entity’s trustworthiness resting on apparent expertise and
experience (i.e., competence-based trust), as well as perceived
openness, honesty, and concern for others (i.e., integrity-based
trust) [102–104]. For example, the efﬁcacy of public awareness
campaigns and informational appeals can often depend on the
perceived credibility of the communication source [105]. If the
source of a message seems untrustworthy, unfair or incompe-
tent, people can be wary or sceptical and either disengage, or
react defensively to the information.
11. draw on readily available information that is easily accessible in
memory and springs to mind quickly (availability bias), especially
personal anecdotes of family/friends, customer testimonials, and
recent, frequent, vivid, salient, emotive or concrete examples
[38,106]. In particular, people tend to estimate the frequency of
future events by drawing heavily on the information most readily
available in memory, which inevitably produces biased estimates
of the likelihood of different outcomes that are relevant to their
decision-making [107].
3. Policy implications
These key insights from behavioural economics and psychology
can guide the effective design and delivery of consumer-focused
strategies and public policy interventions to improve residential
energy conservation, particularly solutions that capitalise on
message framing, choice architecture and incentivisation to shift
human behaviour. While an exhaustive summary of all possible
implications is beyond the scope of this paper, we encourage
practitioners and policymakers to consider the impact of – and the
potential opportunities created by – these persistent cognitive
biases and ‘irrationalities’ when determining how best to shift
consumer behaviour in the desired direction. Some examples of
these implications and opportunities follow, with an emphasis on
identifying practical, cost-effective and mass-scalable solutions to
encourage more renewable and sustainable energy use among
consumers.
 Status quo bias and defaults: The effectiveness of behavioural
interventions can be enhanced by directly targeting those
energy-related practices that can easily and effortlessly be
modiﬁed using default settings—for example, encourage house-
holders to perform one-off actions such as setting a dishwasher
or washing machine’s default program to ‘short-cycle’ and/or to
‘cold’ water (for an applied example, see [108]). Evidence from
ﬁeld studies and experimental trials also suggests that con-
sumer acceptance of energy-related programmes and initia-
tives can be signiﬁcantly improved by setting the participation
default option to ‘opt-out’ (where all customers are automati-
cally enrolled in the program/initiative and disinterested cus-
tomers must actively withdraw from participating) rather than
‘opt-in’ (where interested customers must actively enrol if they
wish to participate) [45–47,109]. For example, across several
ﬁeld studies and laboratory experiments, Pichert and Katsiko-
poulos [45] found that people use the kind of electricity that is
offered to them as the default, that is, more participants chose
a green (e.g., environmentally friendly) utility when it was the
default than when ‘grey’ electricity (e.g., coal or atomic power)
was the default. Ideally, strategies that target inertia and
encourage people to shift from the status quo (e.g., offering
‘free trial’ periods or ‘try-before-you-buy’ programmes, or
simply presenting options neutrally to elicit an active choice)
should capitalise on salient ‘trigger points’ in peoples’ lives,
that is, signiﬁcant life events such as moving house, marriage
or the birth of a child, when automatic, routine and habitual
behaviour patterns are disrupted and people are more amen-
able to change [110,111].
 Satisﬁcing: Since people rely on increasingly simple heuristics
in the face of complexity and uncertainty (e.g., satisﬁcing rather
than optimising), various simpliﬁcation strategies may help
reduce cognitive overload and facilitate more effective deci-
sion-making in regard to energy consumption – such as making
a desired action easier, quicker and more convenient (e.g.,
automating relevant technology), minimising the physical and
psychological demands needed to perform the action (e.g.,
making it the default) and reducing perceived uncertainty
(e.g., encouraging people to try a new activity in a risk-free
environment) [14,112,113]. Unnecessary complexity and sen-
sory overload should be avoided by framing messages in a clear,
concise and comprehensible format. In terms of relaying
information to consumers, keeping things short and simple is
essential for effective communication. For example, avoid
inundating people with too many energy-saving tips or too
many choices, instead presenting smaller amounts of the most
important information. Indeed, laboratory experiments and
ﬁeld studies have found that having more choices is not
necessarily more desirable, appealing or intrinsically motivat-
ing, and people may even perform better in limited-choice
contexts [42,114]. Simply providing large amounts of informa-
tion, procedural instructions and other educational material
may therefore fail to produce long-term behaviour change,
particularly if such information is highly complex, delivered in
isolation (i.e., without reference to social norms, goals,
(footnote continued)
and/or because they care about what others think of them (e.g., public recognition
of altruism and philanthropy).
8 Over-justiﬁcation effects occur when an external incentive decreases a
person's intrinsic motivation to perform a desired behaviour [84,87], such that
the rate of that behaviour may fall below the baseline level following removal of the
incentive. Moral licensing effects occur when a person who performs one type of
desired or 'good' behaviour may subsequently be less likely to engage in other
desired behaviours, or even more likely to engage in undesired or 'bad' behaviours
[85,86,160].
9 Motivational crowding-out effects have been observed across laboratory and
ﬁeld settings [18]. For example, small ﬁnancial payments have been found to
reduce peoples’ willingness to donate [15,90], while in a test-taking setting, Gneezy
and Rustichini [91] found that monetary compensation had monotonic effects on
performance—larger incentives yielded higher performance when money was
offered, but volunteers who were offered small monetary incentives actually
performed worse than those who were not offered compensation.
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feedback, rewards etc.) or if people already have the requisite
knowledge needed to act accordingly10. Rather than delivering
information-intensive campaigns and complicated consumer
education programmes, behavioural strategies should instead
focus on communicating simple messages that the average
consumer can quickly and easily understand [22,42].
 Loss aversion: Frame energy-saving messages in terms of
avoiding or minimising prospective costs and losses, as this
may make the information more salient, memorable and
motivating. Rather than only emphasising the payoffs of saving
energy (a gain-framed message), focus on the costs (i.e., time,
effort, money) associated with energy-wasting practices
(a loss-framed message), and highlight how energy conserva-
tion activities and pro-environmental behaviour will prevent
future losses and costs. Loss-framed messages often have a
greater behavioural impact than gain-framed messages, parti-
cularly when a self-referencing frame (i.e., emphasising losses
to oneself) is used and/or losses for the current generation are
emphasised [115–118]. For example, Gonzales et al. [119] have
suggested that when communicating messages to improve
householders’ energy efﬁciency (e.g., advocating retroﬁtting),
framing recommendations in terms of loss (i.e., energy and
money lost via inaction) rather than gain (i.e., energy or money
gained via action) may be more effective. Thus, a statement
such as, ‘You are currently losing $20 per billing quarter by not
switching off your lights’ is likely to be more motivating than
stating, ‘You could save $20 per quarter by turning off your
lights’. Likewise, stating, ‘What you are currently doing is three
times less efﬁcient than doing x’ is likely to be more motivating
than, ‘Doing x is three times more efﬁcient than what you are
currently doing’. However, various factors may moderate the
motivational impact of a particular message frame (e.g., level of
risk associated with target behaviour, who/what the reference
point is, characteristics of target audience), and these should be
taken into account to maximise the effectiveness of consumer-
focused communication, particularly when tailoring messages
to different customer segments (for a comprehensive summary,
see [117]). For example, some evidence from persuasive social
contexts suggests that while negative message frames may be
more effective with self-referencing appeals, positive frames
may be more effective given a self-other frame (i.e., emphasis-
ing the beneﬁts to oneself and others) [116].
 Risk aversion: Focus on the low-risk of energy-saving practices
and investments that are safe, stable and secure, particularly
where energy-efﬁciency technology is new, expensive, or not
yet mainstream. Uncertainty around electricity supply, market
prices, government policies and long-term ﬁnancial payoffs
make investing in energy-saving products and services seem
like a risky decision for many consumers [120,121], so market-
ing and communication to alleviate these perceived risks may
increase energy-efﬁcient action. Extensive research has exam-
ined the impact of different risk-reduction strategies (‘risk
relievers’) on consumer behaviour, particularly in retail envir-
onments where perceived risk and uncertainty may prevent
people from purchasing new products or services [122–128].
Particularly relevant to household energy efﬁciency and con-
servation are ‘relievers’ for ﬁnancial risks (e.g., offering
discounts, rebates, lowest-price and money-back guarantees,
no-cost returns/refunds, payment security), time risks (e.g.,
making the purchase decision and product installation quick),
and effort risks (e.g., simpliﬁed product design, ‘user-friendly’
operating instructions, helpful customer service). For example,
offering consumers money-back guarantees on new energy-
efﬁcient technology (e.g., direct load control devices, smart
meters) or obligation-free trials of new services (e.g., renewable
or 'green' electricity) may increase consumer uptake by provid-
ing a 'safety net' – a sense of certainty and security – around
any 'unknowns'. Other useful ‘relievers’ may include strategies
to reduce perceived risks around product/service performance
and functionality (e.g., offering free trials/samples, demonstra-
tions, guarantees, extended warranties, free product installa-
tion and/or training), physical and safety risks (e.g., providing
instructions, expert advice, safety certiﬁcation, independent
testing), the risk of product obsolescence (e.g., promising free
or low-cost upgrades, product compatibility with earlier ver-
sions), social risks (e.g., securing positive word-of-mouth,
customer testimonials, celebrity or expert endorsements, or
promoting products or services as popular or socially desir-
able), and even psychological risks (e.g., building brand cred-
ibility, customer loyalty) [128].
 Sunk costs: Frame messages to reduce the salience of any
large costs (e.g., time, effort, money) that consumers have
already outlaid for old energy-inefﬁcient items they are reluc-
tant to discard, upgrade or replace, such as incandescent light
bulbs or obsolete electrical appliances (e.g., defunct refrigera-
tors, outdated air conditioning units). At the same time, draw
attention to any ongoing costs, losses or risks associated with
retaining inefﬁcient items and wasteful energy practices—for
example, increased consumption, greater carbon emissions,
higher electricity bills, product wear-and-tear, and ongoing
costs for repair and maintenance of outdated appliances.
Research suggests that making the opportunity costs of persis-
tence in the face of setbacks more salient (e.g., providing
information about alternative opportunities for achieving
returns on money that has been invested in unproﬁtable
pursuits) may increase the likelihood of people writing-off
sunk costs by highlighting the ‘certain loss’ of persisting with
the status quo (thus exploiting the bias arising from peoples’
aversion to sure losses) and making abandonment seem like a
more positive option [129]. In parallel, it is important to reduce
the salience of any perceived upfront costs/losses of switching
to the desired course of action, e.g., taking steps towards energy
conservation11. Offering consumers incentives or rewards for
investing in energy-saving measures – such as rebates for
installing retroﬁts, cash-back bonuses for upgrading appliances,
or discounts for subscribing to green electricity – may also be
effective, by focusing attention on the potential beneﬁts that
can be gained from taking a different course of action (i.e.,
replacing old inefﬁcient products/practices with new efﬁcient
ones) rather than the costs/losses that have already been
incurred. Research has found that in certain conditions, sunk
cost effects may be reduced when the decision-making
10 In many cases, standard information-intensive campaigns, factual messages
and other educational programs do not directly target intrinsic or extrinsic
motivation. For maximum effectiveness, such strategies are therefore best used
when people are already motivated to act, and when there are few barriers to
impede the target behaviour [14]. Since educational programs and mass media
campaigns often rely heavily on procedural information, instructions and ‘appeals’
to shift behaviour, the effectiveness of these approaches may be increased by
presenting information that is simple, salient, personally relevant (tailored),
delivered by a credible and trusted source, and combined with other motivational
strategies (e.g., goal-setting, feedback, incentives, and structural changes to the
situation/environment/context that ‘make it easy’ to perform the new behaviour).
11 To maximise its salience, a cost/loss should be presented in isolation; but to
minimise its salience, the cost/loss should be combined or embedded in a larger
one. Thus, if the costs/losses of a desired energy-saving action are large (e.g., if
upgrading to a new efﬁcient appliance is expensive, time-consuming and effortful),
combining or aggregating small savings/beneﬁts may be effective. For example,
saying ‘You can save $150 per year by purchasing a new energy-efﬁcient
refrigerator’ is likely to be more motivating than ‘You can save 40¢ per day by
purchasing a new energy-efﬁcient refrigerator’.
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scenario includes explicit estimates of the future returns (e.g.,
projected sales/income) the given options might yield, possibly
by way of reducing the amount of attention people direct
toward sunk costs [130]. It has also been found that although
asking people to carefully consider the ‘pros and cons’ of all
available options after incurring sunk costs may not reduce the
bias, setting minimal targets for performance (i.e., goal-setting)
and inducing people to evaluate performance against such
targets may be effective [131].
 Temporal and spatial discounting: Because the costs of investing
in energy-efﬁciency measures (e.g., buying new low-emission
technology) are often immediate and large, whereas the
beneﬁts are delayed and gradually accrue over time, one should
draw attention to the longer-term payoffs of energy conserva-
tion when framing customer-focused messages. Research sug-
gests that various factors may diminish temporal discounting,
reduce impulsivity and/or encourage delayed gratiﬁcation and
self-control—including pre-commitment [132,133]; experien-
cing ‘power’ (a sense of asymmetric control over valued out-
comes and resources) [134]; a technique called ‘episodic future
thinking’, which involves imagining hypothetical future events
[135]; and providing a more concrete construal of future events
(describing speciﬁc details and features of future events, so
they appear more vivid, certain and tangible) [136]. Recently,
Hershﬁeld et al. [137] found that connecting people to their
‘future selves’ (via interaction with photorealistic age-
processed renderings of themselves) led to lower discounting
of future rewards and higher contributions to saving accounts.
Such insights should be considered when designing consumer-
focused strategies to incentivise the long-term beneﬁts of
energy conservation. In parallel, consumers should also be
more immediately rewarded for taking positive actions now
that will yield greater beneﬁts (e.g., save energy) in the long-
term. For example, consider offering immediate intrinsic
rewards (e.g., praise, commendation, recognition, acceptance
etc.) or even extrinsic incentives (e.g., in-kind gifts) for those
actions that ordinarily have little immediate payoff.
 Normative social inﬂuence: Where possible, frame energy-
saving practices as both common and socially desirable. For
example, advising consumers that people similar to them (e.g.,
peers, neighbours) are using less energy or taking certain
energy-saving actions, in addition to conveying social approval
of such actions, will likely motivate them to conform to these
positive ‘energy saving’ norms and reduce their consumption
accordingly. Extensive research supports the efﬁcacy of social
normative information for motivating pro-social and altruistic
behaviour, including energy conservation [14,138–147]. For
instance, Nolan et al. [141] found that consumers who received
descriptive normative messages (e.g., information comparing a
household’s energy usage to that of neighbours) used signiﬁ-
cantly less energy in the short-term compared to householders
who only received energy saving ‘tips’. Schultz [14] has recently
argued that the behavioural impact of social norms is greatest
when the target behaviour is relatively simple and easy to
perform (i.e., few barriers impede action) and people perceive
few beneﬁts from engaging in the behaviour (i.e., individual
motivation is low). Research also suggests that the behavioural
impact of normative messages is greater when social norms are
contextualised with personally relevant, meaningful or loca-
lised information (e.g., ‘provincial norms’ about how people are
behaving in one’s immediate social group can be more power-
ful than distal or global norms; see [148]) and when congruent
descriptive and injunctive normative messages are combined
[146,149]. For people who are already performing better than
the norm, it is particularly important to include an injunctive
norm (e.g., a smiley-face emoticon, to serve as positive
reinforcement) with the descriptive norm message to prevent a
‘boomerang effect’, where those who learn they have been
under-estimating the prevalence of an undesired behaviour
may then increase that undesired behaviour (for examples in
the residential energy domain, see [138,146,147]). Because
people tend to shift their behaviour toward the norm, it is
particularly important to focus on positive norms (desirable
behaviours) rather than negative norms (undesirable
behaviours).
 Intrinsic and extrinsic rewards: Since monetary rewards often
yield inconsistent and temporary effects, and may even backﬁre
by undermining (‘crowding out’) intrinsic motivation, non-
pecuniary rewards such as praise, recognition and social
approval should be capitalised on to incentivise energy con-
servation. While ﬁnancial incentives are often used in efforts to
promote pro-environmental behaviour [81,112], research sug-
gests that such approaches may compare unfavourably to non-
monetary interventions in terms of producing durable beha-
viour change over the longer term [14,22]. For example, people
may be more motivated to act altruistically simply because it
makes them feel good about themselves (e.g., yielding
increased self-esteem and the ‘warm glow’ that arises from
feeling selﬂess and socially responsible) and because they care
about what others think of them (e.g., public recognition of
altruism and philanthropy). Consistent with this notion,
Ostrom [150] has argued that reciprocity, trust and reputation
can overcome short-term self-interest, with evidence from
public good experiments showing that many people are con-
ditional co-operators, that is, they will contribute to the pro-
vision of public goods if they trust others to do the same [161].
Other research suggests that intrinsic rewards in the form of
commendation, public recognition and praise may have stron-
ger and more consistent behavioural effects than monetary
rewards [89,151]. Focusing on these intrinsic rewards, or even
providing an ‘in-kind’ gift coupled with suggestions to conserve
energy, may therefore prove more impactful than relying solely
on ﬁnancial incentives to encourage sustainable behaviour.
 Free-riding and social loaﬁng: Creating a shared group identity
where people can feel their individual contribution is impor-
tant, and emphasising that many other consumers are also
actively saving energy (i.e., capitalising on descriptive social
norms), may help reduce free-riding and social loaﬁng in group
settings. Making any shared outcomes or collective achieve-
ments more salient (e.g., ‘Many of your neighbours are saving
energy, and together this community has achieved a marked
reduction in the average electricity bill’), and publicly acknowl-
edging the efforts of individuals, may also help motivate people
to contribute to the greater good. Experimental work also
suggests that embedding social dilemmas and intragroup con-
ﬂict in intergroup competition may reduce free-riding (see
[152]) and inducing a sense of social inclusion may increase
pro-social behaviour by fostering empathetic concern for
others [153].
 Perceived trust: Since trust serves as a decision-making tool for
reducing cognitive complexity [96] and may inﬂuence how
people respond to various risks [97,98], information and
incentives are likely to be more motivating – and therefore
have greater behavioural impact – if they stem from credible,
trustworthy sources. In support of this notion, Craig and
McCann [154] found that messages identiﬁed as originating
from a high-credibility source (e.g., public service commission)
were associated with signiﬁcantly more customer requests for
energy conservation information, as well as greater actual
electricity savings, than the same messages originating from
a low-credibility source (e.g., local electrical utility). Costanzo
et al. [105], in their social-psychological view of energy
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conservation behaviour, also suggest that credibility – which is
a function of expertise and perceived trustworthiness – plays a
key role in how consumers evaluate and respond to large-scale
information campaigns, messages and appeals about energy
conservation. This previous research underscores how impor-
tant it is for behavioural interventions that promote energy
conservation to be delivered by individuals and/or organisa-
tions seen to possess attributes conducive to trust such as
competence, reliability, objectivity, openness, fairness, consis-
tency, faith and good will [97,98,155]. When framing and
delivering energy-saving messages to consumers, attention
should be paid to establishing two broad types of trust in the
message source: competence-based trust (i.e., perceived exper-
tise and experience) and integrity-based trust (i.e., perceived
honesty, fairness, openness, and concern for public interest).
 Availability heuristics: Since people place disproportionate weight
on information that is more recent and readily available,
consumer-focused messages should incorporate examples of
energy-saving actions that are easily available in consumers’
memories (e.g., recent, frequent, concrete, personally relevant)
and especially salient (e.g., vivid, emotionally charged). Referring
to energy-saving behaviours that are topical or well-publicised in
the media, and drawing on favourable customer testimonials,
may bring energy conservation to the forefront of consumers’
consciousness and make it appear more socially normative
(i.e., common). In situations where people simply forget to
perform energy-efﬁcient behaviours, basic visual or auditory
reminders can prompt consumers to act. Studies have found
that simple prompts and reminders can increase a range of
pro-environmental behaviours, including energy conservation
[112,156,157]. Schultz [14] suggests that prompts tend to work
best for behaviours that are simple, easy, effortless and repetitive,
and for people who are already motivated to engage in the
desired action. Where possible, visual cues and vivid descriptions
should be used because people are more heavily inﬂuenced by
salient information. For example, Thaler and Sunstein [158] have
reported that giving customers an 'Ambient Orb' – a light bulb
that provides a simple yet salient signal of energy consumption by
changing colour (glowing red when consumption is high, but
green when consumption is low) – reduced peak energy con-
sumption by 40 per cent.
4. Directions for future research
Decades of research in psychology and behavioural economics
have yielded a range of valuable insights for understanding consumer
decision-making and behaviour, however some theoretical and
empirical gaps inevitably remain. These gaps in the literature offer
potentially fruitful avenues for future scientiﬁc enquiry. For example,
there is still great scope to advance our understanding of the critical
determinants (predictors, moderators and mediators) of energy
consumption, as well as the precise impact that public policy
interventions have on consumers making optimal shifts in behaviour.
In particular, questions remain over the utility, scalability and cost-
effectiveness of the various behavioural interventions intended to
inﬂuence energy consumers, as well as the contexts, contingencies
and boundary conditions that either constrain or facilitate the impact
of such interventions. Because human behaviour varies across time
and situations, and within and between individuals, there are limits
to the generalisability of research ﬁndings. Future research should
therefore focus more on understanding not only what predicts
consumers’ behaviour – and importantly, what predicts changes in
such behaviour across time and place – but also when, where, how,
why and for whom these effects occur. Gaining greater insights into
such complexities can best be achieved by conducting more rigorous
scientiﬁc research—namely, randomised controlled trials with larger
samples of participants, more objective measures of actual behaviour,
and longitudinal data collected over extended timeframes. To date,
most empirical research on residential energy consumption has
involved non-randomised and/or non-experimental studies, which
are inadequate for testing causal relationships and determining the
direct effects of predictor on outcome variables, including the precise
causal impact of various interventions on changes in behaviour. In
summary, researchers, practitioners and policymakers will proﬁt
greatly from conducting more rigorous experiments, designing inter-
ventions that actually seek to exploit these cognitive biases that
diverge from neoclassical economic assumptions, and testing the
impact and cost-effectiveness of these interventions for promoting
residential energy conservation.
More broadly, there is also vast scope to enhance the con-
ceptual frameworks and empirical measurement of key beha-
vioural economic principles as they are applied to energy policy.
There is a growing call among researchers for a consistent frame-
work that synthesises these behavioural anomalies [23,159],
alongside greater reliance on empirical research and impact
evaluation (to test reliability and generalisability), more studies
with large-scale interventions (to test scalability), and further
research on the durability of effects (to test both short- and
long-run behavioural changes). From a theoretical standpoint,
researchers should aim to develop simple yet general models that
explain a large portion of the psychological phenomena we have
cited herein, including the additive and interactive effects of
different cognitive biases. Some critics of behavioural economics
have claimed it is merely a collection of ad hoc examples and
convincing anecdotes about economic choices, with no overarch-
ing framework to unify and integrate the various theories, con-
cepts and principles. There is clearly value in developing more
systematic theoretical models that not only explain previous
ﬁndings, but can also make accurate predictions about future
outcomes—for different people, places and points in time.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have highlighted the complexity of household
energy consumption and conservation behaviour, and shown the
utility of applying key principles from psychology and behavioural
economics to explain, predict and change such behaviour. Consumers
are far from the purely rational decision-makers assumed by tradi-
tional economic models, and there is often a wide gap between
peoples' values and material interests, and their actual behaviour. Put
simply, people often act in ways that both fail to align with their
knowledge, values, attitudes and intentions, and fall short of max-
imising their material interests. A growing body of research indicates
that consumer choices and behaviour are, to a large extent, driven by
cognitive biases, heuristics and other 'predictably irrational' tenden-
cies—for example, people use mental shortcuts to cut through
complexity, dislike losses more than they like gains, prefer lower-
value certainties over higher-value risks, evaluate things in relative
rather than absolute terms, and are heavily inﬂuenced by the people
around them. Yet these cognitive biases and motivational factors
are often overlooked by practitioners and policymakers seeking
to promote energy efﬁciency and conservation. To ensure cost-
effectiveness and maximise return on investment, it is important to
take these phenomena into account when developing strategies for
encouraging renewable and sustainable energy use, and for motivat-
ing pro-environmental behaviour more broadly. By understanding
these predictable deviations from economically rational behaviour,
policymakers will be better placed to craft interventions that success-
fully bridge the gap between pro-environmental knowledge, values,
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attitudes and intentions, and the everyday energy-related behaviour
of consumers. This paper has highlighted the value of applying
insights from psychology and behavioural economics to inform the
effective design and delivery of consumer-focused communication,
messages, and other behavioural interventions aimed at encouraging
household energy conservation.
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